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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Let me begin by first thanking Professor Weinstein for his illuminative and creative 
discussion on a topic that has generated its own fair share of literature.  It is of value to this 
group to be exposed to theories of argumentation which have been informed by and which 
deal with scientific types of reasoning broadly construed. 
 In his own words, Weinstein’s paper may strike some as “regressive” for he attempts 
to exploit Sellars’ distinction of the scientific and the manifest images in order to push a 
notion of ‘truth’ as understood by the logicians (scientific) and the informal logicians and 
argumentation theorists (manifest).   Weinstein’s tool in this is his metamathematical model 
for emerging truth (MET) to which you have been exposed. 
 In my brief commentary I propose to do the following: a. raise some questions 
pertaining to matters of fact and b. raise some questions pertaining to matters of clarification 
or of possibility.  All this, though, will be done in light of the fact that I truly appreciate and 
like Weinstein’s approach.   
 
2.  MATTERS OF FACT 
 
As it stands, Weinstein’s paper benefits from reading his previous work as well as looking 
into the emerging literature located at the intersection of philosophy and computational 
sciences, most notably the work of Lorenzo Magnani and the various conferences recently in 
computation, cognition, and philosophy that he has generated. 
Weinstein commences by teasing the reader with an analogy:  the scientific is to the 
manifest as physics is to sense perception, or as logic is to informal logic.  The connection 
Weinstein gives is MET.  If my reading of Weinstein is correct here, and without getting into 
the fine details of MET, the divide between the logicians and the informal logicians is 
bridged by the ultra-mathematical model of MET very much like the physical science and 
everyday sense-observation divide is bridged by a Newtonian world-view accompanied by 
the “ontology of medium level physical chemistry” and the like.  Now Weinstein has already 
hinted that this may seem regressive and, indeed, informal logicians and argumentation 
theorists 25 or 30 years in may twinge at the prospect of adopting a formal model reminiscent 
of all that they have foregone.  Question:  is there something in MET other than the 
formalism that “cancels” out this seemingly perverseness of it being a bridge?  In other 
words, I think we need to be careful in how we characterize formal and informal logic for 
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after all formal logicians theorize about natural deduction as do informal logicians construct 
technical systems.  (I’m challenging Weinstein’s claim to the regressive nature of his thesis!) 
Secondly, it isn’t clear to me how to situate MET.  It is characterized as having 
relevance filters, having contextual sets of rigor, being non-monotonic, and that it is dynamic 
in that warrants are re-evaluated in light of new evidence  -- all the ingredients of a sound 
informal logic theory.  Now throw into the mix mathematical and computational concepts of 
modelling (including mapping and functions) and entailment and we have a brief 
characterization of MET.  Interestingly Weinstein claims that entailment is the more novel of 
the two mathematical (read Scientific) concepts, it is the modelling or mapping which 
correlate to the dynamics of arguments.  This strikes me as more positivist than Weinstein 
leads on and it would be curious to hear the author’s own take on how “realism” fits into the 
scheme he has outlined. 
Thirdly, to illustrate the momentum that MET carries, Weinstein moves from his 
“slam dunk” example of the periodic table to show how MET figures into legal and ethical 
reasoning.  First, it is a bit misleading to indicate “the most compelling restriction on legal 
reasoning is a principle of coherence, a conservative principle that valorizes precedent.”  It 
should be noted that coherence is not only a test but an assumption in legal reasoning.  
Indeed, it is on the basis that a body of laws is deemed consistent that increased articulation 
provides us with legal argumentation as being logically compelling. Second, it is not clear 
how MET aides us any more than the wealth of research on analogical reasoning carried out 
vis-à-vis legal reasoning.  That is, and this may not be fair to Weinstein, where does MET get 
us in legal scholarship that current theories (e.g. theories about analogical reasoning) cannot 
or do not? 
 
3. THE POSSIBLE 
 
A number of philosophers working in what is developing as digital humanities, computing 
and philosophy, cognitive science, and AI have been pushing the mainstream philosophical 
community to adopt computation and computers more than as a tool to present our research.  
Paul Thagard talks about computational philosophy of science or computational 
epistemology.  Formal logicians are less and less numbered in philosophy departments, and 
for that matter even in math departments.  They are turning up increasingly in computer 
science departments.  For most of us, it is not hard to see the connection.   
 Weinstein claims: “MET gives a mathematical image of such a structure [the unifying 
property of legal reasoning].  Whether it will prove useful in analysing actual legal 
argumentation remains to be seen.  But its precision should permit computer models of legal 
argument to be constructed and their power across the array of laws and precedents 
determined.”  This is an incredible claim to say the least and I would like to raise three 
points. 1.  If one were to conjecture about this possibility, how should one be guided? 2. 
Would this amount to something like computational informal logic or computation 
argumentation theory? And 3.  Lawyers and judges, like physicians and surgeons, like chefs, 
like engineers, like philosophers of science make various determinations as part of their 
competence.  Does MET give us the tools needed to “model” domain specific expert 
reasoning computationally?  And to sneak one more question in, can MET be used 
reductively to model computationally context free expert knowledge?  I have my suspicions 
about the latter, but do hope for the former.  
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